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                                                                   ABSTRACT 
This paper provides evidence on the role of corruption in mitigating the effect of electricity 
outages on firm performance across the six geo-political zones in Nigeria. In addition, this study 
also assessed effect of self-generation on firm performance across the six geo-political zones and 
comparison were made as to whether it is more profitable for firms to self-generate electricity 
during outage periods or bribe electricity officials to mitigates the effect of electricity outages on 
their performance. Using the World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES), the study employed a 
cross sectional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) techniques 
and the results of the findings indicate that, bribery does not mitigate the effect of electricity 
outages on firms across all the geo-political zones in Nigeria with exception of the North-East 
and the South-East geo-political zones. Although, electricity outage is relatively low in the 
North-East region, further findings revealed that; firms in the south-east region experience the 
highest outage intensity of an average of 122.025 times in a typical month, while those in the 
South-South region experience the lowest outage intensity of an average of 25.845times in a 
typical month. Lastly, contrary to the arguments in the literature that self-generation during 
power holidays improves firm performance, evidence from this study suggests otherwise for 
some geo-political zones in Nigeria. For instance, this study discovered that self-generation is a 
form of indirect tax which has a negative effect on firm performance especially the North-West, 
South-West and South-South geo-political zones.  Also, while it is more profitable for firms in 
the North-Central, North East, and South-East regions to self-generate during power holidays, 
the findings for North-West, South-West and South-South geo-political zones reveal that firms in 
the zones are better off by relying on electricity supply from the public grid. 
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1.0 Introduction 
1.1 Research Issues and Motivation for the Study  
Access to quality and reliable electricity supply is regarded as the main conduits of economic 
growth and development in any part of the world. Unfortunately, in many developing countries 
today, access to quality and reliable electricity supply is abysmal. According to United Nations 
(2015) over 1.2 billion people globally live without electricity and 1 billion more people have 
access to poor and unreliable electricity supply. Out of these statistics the African continent 
constitute about 600million people living without access to electricity (WBES, 2016).  In 
Nigeria, alone about more than 63 million people mostly in the rural communities live without 
access to electricity while the population with access to electricity endures frequent power 
outages which last for several hours or days (Leo et al., 2014). 
 
Poor access to quality and reliable electricity hampers or completely halt business and economic 
activities thereby leading to poor economic growth and development. On the other hand, access 
to quality and reliable electricity supply leads to sustainable economic growth, rapid 
industrialization, improved standard of living, decline in unemployment and poverty rate 
(Jorgenson, 1984; Toman & Jemelkoya 2003; Modi et al., 2005; Ozturk, 2010; Bacon & Kojima, 
2016; Stern et al., 2017). Evidence from empirical studies, lend credence to these facts. For 
instance, Rud (2011) examined the effect of rural electricity provision on industrial output in 
India and found a significant positive relationship between rural electrification and industrial 
output.  In the same light, Fisher-Vaden et al., (2015) analysed the effects of electricity shortages 
on firm productivity in China and shows significant output and revenue losses due to outages. 
Doe and Emmanuel (2016) demonstrated that poor electricity leads to decline in output, revenue 
and firm’s profit in Ghana; Abotsi (2016) also shows that power failure reduces the production 
efficiency of firms in most African countries; Mensah (2016) found power failure to have a 
negative effect on manufacturing output in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). In spite of these 
overwhelming evidence in the economic literature and government intervention in the sector for 
many decades, access to quality and uninterrupted electricity supply in Nigeria has continued 
remained poor. According to World Bank (2015), the average outage intensity in Nigeria is 32.8 
in a typical month, which is adjudged to be the highest in SSA (Eifert et al., 2008; Alby et al., 
2012; Mensah 2016). 
 
 Poor electricity supply is one of the major obstacle to economic growth and development in 
Nigeria. It is responsible for the loss of output amounting to US$470billion (N71 trillion) 
measured in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between 1999 and 2015 (Iwayemi, 2018). 
Also, poor access to electricity has been identified to be a major obstacle to business operations 
in Nigeria. For example, about 35.5% of firms reported to have identified electricity outages as a 
major setback to their business performance (WBES, 2014).  
Unreliable electricity supply in Nigeria, is linked to poor power infrastructure facilities 
(Iwayemi, 2018). However, improving electricity supply from the grid does not entirely rest on 
investing in physical electrical infrastructures. The problems are much deeper which goes 
beyond the electricity industry and maybe closely linked to areas such as corruption, political 
institutions and governance (Pless & Fell 2017). Hence, what determines electricity outages are 
very complex and may be of interest to the policy makers, profit oriented enterprises and 
households. It is against this background that this paper will seek to investigate the role of 
 3 | P a g e  
 
corruption in mitigating the effect of electricity outages on firm performance across the six geo-
political zones in Nigeria. 
In this paper we further advance the literatures in the field of energy economics and industrial 
organizations by offering the following innovations. First, we account for the role of corruption 
in mitigating the effect of electricity outages on firm performance across the six geo-political 
zones in Ngeria and thereafter made comparison whether it is more profitable to bribe electricity 
officials or self-generate electricity during outage periods. A review of recent studies in the 
literature reveals three strands of literature which are categorised into the following. The first 
strand focuses on the relationship between electricity outages and firm performance (see for 
example Eifert et al, 2008; Steinbuks and Foster, 2010; Rud, 2011; Alby et al, 2012; Alam, 2013; 
Cissokho & Seck, 2013; Allcott, 2014; Doe & Emmanuel, 2014; Fisher-Vanden et al., 2014; and 
Abeberese, 2016; Abotsi, 2016; Mensah, 2016; and Arlet, 2017). The second strand of the 
literature examined the relationship between corruption and firm performance (see for example 
Johnson et al, 2000; Fisman and Svesson, 2007; Vial and Hanoteau, 2010; Wu, 2008; Lee et al, 
2010; De Rosa et al, 2010; Abudu, 2017 and Okafor, 2017). While the third strand examined the 
relationship between bribery and electricity reliability (Pless & Fell, 2017). In spite of the 
increasing number of literatures on this subject, there is no study yet at least to the best our 
knowledge that attempts to examine the role of corruption in mitigating the effect of electricity 
on firm performance.  
In addition, we control for endogeneity effect which has been neglected by previous studies. The 
problem of endogeneity biasness arises when an endogenous variable correlates with the error 
term in a model. For this study, we suspect that there may be need to control for any potential 
endogeneity problem that may result from our predictors of firm performance (self-generation 
and electricity outages). The problem of endogeneity is expected for convenience and to separate 
the predictors of self-generation and electricity outage in firm performance. It is essential to 
suspect such biasness especially where there is strong relationship between the regressors and the 
error terms in our regression model. Thus, given the significance of the endogeneity effect on the 
dependent variable, accounting for it becomes very necessary in this paper. 
 
1.2 The Structure of the Nigerian Electricity Sector 
The structure of the Nigerian electricity constitutes the Generation Companies (GENCOs), 
Distribution Companies (DISCOs), Transmission Company of Nigeria and the Nigeria 
Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC). The structure of the electricity GENCOs comprises 
six companies out of which four are gas power plants and two are hydro power plants. The gas 
power plants include: Afam, Egbin, Sapele and Ughelli power plants and the hydro power plants 
include the Kainji and Shiroro power plants as observed in Figure 2.1 below. From the forgone it 
can be said that the structure of the GENCOs is largely dominated by gas power plants. In 2016 
it was reported that the gas power plants constitute about 86% of the total electricity generation 
while the remaining 14% is generated from hydroelectric power plants. The dominance of gas 
power plants in the Nigerian electricity industry indicates the massive investment in gas 
generating power plants capacity as a results of the large deposit of natural gas in the country. 
For instance, natural gas reserves in Nigeria has been estimated to be around 192 trillion standard 
cubic feet, making it the ninth largest natural gas reserves in the world. However, in recent years’ 
gas supply to power stations for electricity generation, has declined significantly due to frequent 
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gas pipeline vandalization mostly driven by militancy activities within the Niger Delta region. 
Similarly, the electricity generation from hydro power has been reported to have dwindled in 
recent times as a result of the global climate change which affect the water cycle (Iwayemi, 
2018). 
 
On the other hand, the structure of the electricity DISCOs comprises eleven companies namely, 
Abuja, Benin, Eko, Enugu, Ibadan, Ikeja, Jos, Kano, Kaduna, Port Harcourt and Yola DISCOs 
covering the entire 36 states of Nigeria including the FCT. The DISCOs are separate entities but 
are responsible in buying electricity units in bulk from the transmission company and selling in 
smaller units to households and industries within their respective regions. While the transmission 
and regulatory activities is carried out by the government through the Transmission Company of 
Nigeria (TCN) and the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC) respectively 
(Iwayemi, 2018).   
 
Figure 1: The Structure of the Nigerian Electricity Market-The Supply Side 
  
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Source: NERC, 2016 
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1.3 Overview of Outage Intensity in Nigeria 
Over the years, electricity outages have continued to remain a major constrain to business 
activities across the nooks and crannies of Nigeria. Unreliable power supply has completely 
halted many businesses and also contributed to the mass exodus of firms from Nigeria to other 
neighbouring West African countries where electricity supply is relatively stable. The poor 
electricity supply in Nigeria is further shown in Figure 2 below. The figure reported the average 
outage intensity in a typical month for some selected firms across the six geo-political zones. It is 
observed that the South-East region has the highest outage intensity with an average outage 
intensity of about 122.025 in a typical month when compared to 34.314 in North-Central, 34.042 
in North-West, 30.753 in North-East, 30.047 in South-West and 25.845 in South-South regions. 
This is not surprising because the region reported to have recorded the highest outage intensity of 
about 2000 as compared to 1000 in the North-Central, 630 in the North-West, 372 in the South-
West, 200 in the North-East and lastly 100 in the South-South region.  
 
Source: Authors’ Computation from World Bank Enterprise Survey, 2014 
 
2.0 Literature Review  
A review of empirical literature reveals that studies on electricity outages, corruption and firm 
performance have occupied a substantial body of energy and industrial economics literature in 
recent times.  Several studies have been carried out on the relationship between electricity 
outages and firm performance for both single and cross country in which their findings agreed 
with each other. For example, Adenikinju (2005) investigated the impact of electricity failure in 
developing countries using Nigeria as a case study. He reported that frequent power outages 
affect business firms negatively but the impact is severe on Small and Medium Scale Enterprises 
(SMEs). Similarly, in more recent study, Arlet (2017) examined the impact of electricity tariffs, 
power outages on firm performance using firm level survey data from 190 countries, the study 
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found power outage to have a negative impact on firm performance across the globe. However, 
the impact is severe on small and medium scale enterprises. Other studies in the literature (see 
for example Eifert et al, 2008; Steinbuks and Foster, 2010; Rud, 2011; Alby et al, 2012; Alam, 
2013; Cissokho & Seck, 2013; Allcott, 2014; Doe & Emmanuel, 2014; Fisher-Vanden et al., 
2014; and Abeberese, 2016; Abotsi, 2016; Mensah, 2016) also found electricity outages to have 
a negative impact on firm performance.    
 
On the other hand, studies on corruption and firm performance reveals mixed findings. Some 
studies (see for example Johnson et al, 2000; Fisman & Svesson, 2007; Wu, 2008; Lee et al, 
2010; De Rosa et al, 2010; Abudu, 2017 and Okafor, 2017) found corruption to have a negative 
impact on firm performance for both single and cross country analysis. In contrast, Vial and 
Hanoteau (2010) found corruption to have a positive effect on the firm performance in Indonesia. 
Their findings endorse the “grease to the wheels” hypothesis where firms that give higher 
financial inducement have improved performance.  
Empirical studies on corruption and electricity are very scarce and recent. The only study so far 
to the best of our knowledge is by Pless and Fell (2017) on the effect of bribery on electricity 
reliability. The study found that frequent power outages increase the tendency of firms to give 
bribe to electricity officials. The findings revealed that the likelihood to bribe for an electricity 
connection is associated with an increase of about 14 power outages per month. Further findings 
also reveal that frequent power failure has significant negative impact on firms’ sales revenue. 
Thus, the revenue loss due to frequent power outages is average to about 22% globally.  
 
 
3.0 Theoretical Framework and Methodology  
3.1 Theoretical Framework 
This study is built on the theories of production, revenue and cost which combines to measure 
firm’s profit. Profit in economics is the difference between the revenue a firm receives and the 
costs a firm incurs to produce its goods and services. The theory emphasizes the need for firms to 
take into account all the cost (both implicit and explicit cost) incurs as well as all the revenue 
received in the calculation of profit. Both revenues and costs of a firm largely depends on the 
actions taken by the firm. These actions may take many forms: actual production activities, 
purchase of factors, advertisement are all examples of actions taken by firms in its daily routine 
(Varian, 1992). Following the definition of profit, a representative firm will measure profit as the 
difference between its total revenue and total cost as specified below: 
 𝝅𝒊 = 𝑹𝒊 - 𝑪𝒊                                                                                                                               (1) 
Where 𝑹𝒊 is the total revenue function  and 𝑪𝒊  is the total cost function  
The revenue and cost functions are specified in an explicit form as follows: 
Total Revenue function = R(𝑷𝒚Y )                                                                                           (2) 
Total Cost function = C(𝑷𝒊Y)                                                                                                   (3) 
Where 𝑷𝒚 is the unit price of output; 𝑷𝒊 is the unit price of input;  and Y represent the quantity 
Substituting equation 4.2 and 4.3 into equation 4.1 we obtain the following profit function: 
𝝅𝒊 = R(𝑷𝒚Y ) - C(𝑷𝒊Y)                                                                                                             (4)                                                                                 
Holding the price of product and input constant, equation 4.4 is re-specify as follow: 
𝝅𝒊 = R (Y) - C(Y)                                                                                                                     (5)     
But,  R(Y ) - C(Y) is also equivalent to 𝝅𝒊(Y)                                                                                                                                                                                     
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Therefore, the profit function can also be specified as follows 
 𝝅𝒊= f(Y)                                                                                                                                   (6) 
Where Y = f (A, K, L, M)                                                                                          
By using an extended Cobb-Douglas production function, we assume a representative firm i in 
an industry j operating in a perfectly competitive market produces output 𝑌𝑖 at time t  by 
employing  factor inputs such as Capital “K”, Labor “L”, Materials “M”,  and Electricity “E” 
with production efficiency of the firm represented by A.  The function is specified as follow: 
𝒀𝒊𝒕= f (𝑨𝒊𝒕 , 𝑲𝒊𝒕
𝜷𝟏 , 𝑳𝒊𝒕
𝜷𝟐 , 𝑴𝒊𝒕
𝜷𝟑 , 𝑬𝒊𝒕
𝜷𝟒)                                                                                                (7) 
Where 𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝛽3,  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽4 are factors share of Capital “K”,  Labor “L”, Materials “M”,  and 
Electricity “E”  respectively.  While “𝐴𝑖𝑡 represent the factor productivity. 
Substituting equation (7) in to equation 4.6 we obtain: 
𝝅𝒊= f (𝑨𝒊𝒕 , 𝑲𝒊𝒕
𝜷𝟏 , 𝑳𝒊𝒕
𝜷𝟐 , 𝑴𝒊𝒕
𝜷𝟑 , 𝑬𝒊𝒕
𝜷𝟒)                                                                                                 (8) 
In reality no firm operates in a perfectly competitive environment, but in an imperfect market 
where access to factor inputs such as electricity is limited. Therefore, this study denotes the 
probability of having access to electricity input as ψ, such that ψ ϵ (0, 1). Hence, ψ < 1 when 
there is no reliable electricity supply from the national grid; while ψ = 1 implies the case where 
there is perfect supply of electricity as assumed by the production function in equation (7) above.  
Hence, this study ignored the case where ψ = 0 in this analysis as its represent a situation where 
there is absolutely no access to electricity supply.  
During power outages, firms are usually faced with three options: stop production; generate their 
own electricity using generators or bribe electricity officials to secure constant electricity supply 
from the grid. Thus, the total electricity inputs to firms can be said to be equal to the linear 
combination of electricity inputs from the national grid (𝐸𝑁𝐺) and self-generation (𝐸𝑆𝐺). Thus, 
this is expressed as follows: 
𝑬𝒊𝒕= [ψ𝑬𝑵𝑮,𝒊𝒕 + (𝟏 − 𝝍)𝑬𝑺𝑮,𝒊𝒕]                                                                                                  (9) 
Where 𝐸𝑖𝑡 represent the total electricity supply inputs to firms; 𝐸𝑁𝐺,𝑖𝑡 is the electricity inputs 
from the national grid; while 𝐸𝑆𝐺,𝑖𝑡 is the inputs from self-generation. The equation of firms 
operating under electricity constrain, is obtained by modifying equation (8) to incorporate 
electricity access constraint in equation (9) and vector of control variables “𝑍𝑖𝑡” as follows:  
𝝅𝒊𝒕= 𝑨𝒊𝒕 𝑲𝒊𝒕
𝜷𝟏 𝑳𝒊𝒕
𝜷𝟐 𝑴𝒊𝒕
𝜷𝟑[ψ𝑬𝑵𝑮,𝒊𝒕 + (𝟏 − 𝝍)𝑬𝑺𝑮,𝒊𝒕]
𝜷𝟒 𝒁ɸ                                                            (10) 
Where time “t” is equal to zero in a cross sectional study. Thus, Equation (10) can be re-
specified as follows: 
 𝝅𝒊= 𝑨𝒊 𝑲𝒊
𝜷𝟏 𝑳𝒊
𝜷𝟐 𝑴𝒊
𝜷𝟑𝑬𝒊
𝜷𝟒  [
𝝍𝑬𝑵𝑮,𝒊+(𝟏−𝝍)𝑬𝑺𝑮,𝒊
𝑬𝒊
]𝜷𝟒  𝒁ɸ                                                                     (11)                                          
 If we set 𝑫𝒊= [
𝝍𝑬𝑵𝑮,𝒊+(𝟏−𝝍)𝑬𝑺𝑮,𝒊
𝑬𝒊
]𝜷𝟒; where 0 ≤ 𝐷𝑖 ≤ 1 and  𝐷𝑖 measures the weighted sum of self-
generation and national grid share of the total electricity supply raise to power 𝛽𝐸. If we 
substitute 𝐷𝑖 in equation (4.4) we obtain:  
𝝅𝒊= 𝑨𝒊 𝑲𝒊
𝜷𝟏 𝑳𝒊
𝜷𝟐 𝑴𝒊
𝜷𝟑𝑬𝒊
𝜷𝟒𝑫𝒊𝒁
ɸ                                                                                                  (12) 
To ascertain the impact of poor electricity supply on firm performance, we linearized equation 
(12) by taking the natural logarithm of all the variables in the model, with the exception of profit, 
since negative series cannot be logged. 
𝝅𝒊= 𝑳𝒐𝒈𝑨𝒊+𝜷𝟏 𝑳𝒐𝒈𝑲𝒊+ 𝜷𝟐𝑳𝒐𝒈𝑳𝒊+ 𝜷𝟑𝑳𝒐𝒈𝑴𝒊+𝜷𝟒𝑳𝒐𝒈𝑬𝒊+ 𝑳𝒐𝒈𝑫𝒊 + ɸ𝑳𝒐𝒈𝒁𝟏,𝒊 + 𝜺𝟏,𝒊        (13)                                                                   
By representing the log of variables in equation (13) in a lower case form, we obtain equation 
(14) as specified below 
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𝝅𝒊= 𝒂𝒊+𝜷𝟏 𝒌𝒊+ 𝜷𝟐𝒍𝒊+ 𝜷𝟑𝒎𝒊+𝜷𝟒𝒆𝒊+ 𝒅𝒊 + ɸ𝒛𝟏,𝒊 + 𝜺𝟏,𝒊                                                              (15)          
The Total Factor Productivity (TFP) from equation (7) is equal to 𝑎𝑖+ 𝑑𝑖, where 𝑎𝑖> 0 and 𝑑𝑖ϵ (-
∞, 0). To ascertain the role of bribery in mitigating the effect of electricity outages on firm 
performance, we considered the following scenarios. 
Case 1: Bribery for Electricity Supply: - Assume a firm experience unreliable power supply 
and choose to bribe electricity officials to increase its share of electricity supply from the grid 
than self-generate such that ψ = 1, 𝐸𝑆𝐺,𝑖= 0, 𝐸𝑁𝐺,𝑖= 𝐸𝑖 and 𝐷𝑖= 1, then 𝑑𝑖= 0 and the total factor 
productivity will be equal to 𝑎𝑖. In this scenario, firm level output is unaffected, however, the 
firm incurs additional cost which directly affects its profit, since bribery is like a form of tax.  
Case 2: Unreliable Electricity Supply without Self-generation: - Assume a firm experience 
frequent power outages and does not generate its own electricity, such that ψ < 1, 𝐸𝑆𝐺,𝑖= 0, 
𝐸𝑁𝐺,𝑖< 𝐸𝑖 and 𝐷𝑖< 1, then 𝑑𝑖< 0 and the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) will be less than 𝑎𝑖. 
Thus, when firms do not self-generate to augment for the absence of electricity, their output level 
decreases within the period and consequently revenue and profit of the firm in question declines. 
Case 3: Unreliable Electricity Supply with Partial Self-generation: - Assume another 
scenario where firms generate their own electricity during power outages, nevertheless, the 
quantity generated is not sufficient to compensate for the shortages created by the outages such 
that ψ < 1, 𝐸𝑆𝐺,𝑖> 0, but  ψ𝐸𝑁𝐺,𝑖 + (1 − 𝜓)𝐸𝑆𝐺,𝑖 < 𝐸𝑖, thus 𝐷𝑖< 1. This implies that 𝑑𝑖 will be 
greater than zero but still be less than one and the firm level output will also be less than  𝑎𝑖𝑡, 
however the output losses will be less than case 2. In this case, both the revenue and cost are 
affected and the profit depends on the magnitude of the revenue and the associated cost of partial 
self-generation by firms. 
Case 4: Unreliable Electricity Supply with full Self-generation: - Lastly, this study assumes a 
case whereby firm experience power outages but self-generate to compensate for this shortages 
such that ψ < 1, 𝐸𝑆𝐺,𝑖> 0, and ψ𝐸𝑁𝐺,𝑖 + (1 − 𝜓)𝐸𝑆𝐺,𝑖= 𝐸𝑖, hence, 𝐷𝑖= 1. Consequently, 𝑑𝑖=1 and 
the firm level output is equal to 𝑎𝑖. This implies that firm level output is not affected by the 
frequent electricity outages. In this scenario, firm performance may be sustainable in the short 
run, however due to the rapid increase in the cost of self-generation, profit is likely to decline in 
the long run. This has been confirmed by past literatures who argued that self-generation is rarely 
sustainable beyond the short run. According to Steinbuks & Foster (2010) in their study revealed 
that in many developing countries such as Nigeria, the cost of self-generating an in-house 
electricity is very high when compared to the cost of purchasing electricity from the public grid. 
For example, the cost of in-house electricity generation in Africa has been estimated to fall 
within US$ 0.30-0.70 per kilo watt-hour as against the cost of purchasing electricity from the 
public grid at US$ 0.14 per kilo watt-hour (Steinbuks & Foster 2010; AfDB, 2013; Mensah, 
2016).  
Equation (4.15) shows that firm performance proxy by profit depends on capital (𝑘𝑖), labor (𝑙𝑖), 
material inputs (𝑚𝑖), Poorer electricity supply (𝑒𝑖) which is measured by power outage intensity 
and vector of control variables (𝑧𝑖).  Thus, the real impact of electricity outages 𝛽4 on firm 
performance in equation (15) can only be estimated when the outage intensity variable in the 
model is exogenous. However, this is not the case because outage intensity is always endogenous 
as established by empirical studies (Mensah 2016; Pless & Fell 2017). Therefore, it is likely to 
correlate with the error term or other explanatory variables in model. For example, outage 
intensity could be correlated with other determinants of firm performance such as size, age, 
capital intensity, human capital, industry, business environment etc thereby yielding a bias and 
inefficient estimate.  
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Similarly, the model for electricity supply is rooted in the theory of production. The theory 
argued that a firm produces output from various combination of inputs in a given period of time. 
Since electricity supply is a form of output which depends on electricity supply from public grid 
and firm’s ability to self-generate during power outage. Thus, the production function is 
modified to take the following functional form: 
      𝑬𝒊= f(𝑬𝒔𝒈,𝒊, 𝑬𝒏𝒈,𝒊)                                                                                                               (16) 
Where 𝑬𝒊= Total electricity supply; 𝑬𝒔𝒈,𝒊= Electricity from self-generation; 𝑬𝒏𝒈,𝒊=electricity 
from grid. 
Although, electricity supply from grid is a major determinant of the total electricity supply to a 
particular firm, its supply however could depend on the payment of bribe to electricity officials 
and other factors. The influence of bribery on electricity is clearly explained by institutional 
theory. The theory states that the business environment which a firm operates exert great 
influence on firm’s decision to bribe in order to obtain a favorable service. Since electricity is 
expected to be endogenous, this study therefore, adopted and modified the simple model 
developed by Pless and Fell (2017) to include firm’s ability to self-generate during outage hours 
and other vector of control variables. The model is presented as follows: 
 Hence, electricity supply from grid is specified as follows: 
𝑬𝒏𝒈,𝒊= f(𝑩𝑹𝑰𝑩𝑬𝒊, 𝒁)                                                                                                                  (17) 
Substituting equation (17) into equation (16) we obtain the following: 
      𝑬𝒊= f(𝑬𝒔𝒈,𝒊, 𝑩𝑹𝑰𝑩𝑬𝒊, Z)                                                                                                       (18)   
To ascertain the impact of bribe on electricity supply, we linearized equation (18) by taking the 
natural logarithm as expressed below: 
𝑳𝒐𝒈𝑬𝒊= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏 𝑳𝒐𝒈 𝑩𝑹𝑰𝑩𝑬𝒊 +𝜶𝟐𝑬𝒔𝒈,𝒊 +λ𝑳𝒐𝒈𝒁𝟐,𝒊+ 𝜺𝟐,𝒊                                                     (19) 
By representing the log of variables in equation (19) in a lower case form, we obtain equation 
(20) as specified below: 
𝒆𝒊= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒃𝒓𝒊𝒃𝒆𝒊 +𝜶𝟐𝒆𝒔𝒈,𝒊 +λ𝒛𝟐,𝒊+ 𝜺𝟐,𝒊                                                                                (20)                                                                                               
Where ei represent electricity supply intensity;𝒆𝒔𝒈,𝒊 represent self-generation electricity by firms; 
“𝒃𝒓𝒊𝒃𝒆𝒊” represent bribe payment  for electricity supply and “z” is the vector of control 
variables. 
In order to solve for the direct and indirect effects of bribery and electricity outages on firm 
performance we estimate equation (15) and (20)    
𝛑𝐢= 𝐚𝐢+𝛃𝟏 𝐤𝐢+ 𝛃𝟐𝐥𝐢+ 𝛃𝟑𝐦𝐢+𝛃𝟒𝐞𝐢+ 𝐝𝐢 + ɸ𝐳𝟏,𝐢                                                    
𝐞𝐢=  𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒃𝒓𝒊𝒃𝒆𝒊 + 𝜶𝟐𝒆𝒔𝒈,𝒊 +λ𝒛𝟐,𝒊                                                                                           
From the above set of equations, we obtained: 
The direct effect of electricity outages on firm performance = 
∂πi
∂ei
  = β4      
The direct effect of bribery on electricity outages  = 
∂ei
∂bribei
= α1 
Thus, the role of bribery in moderating the effect of electricity outage on firm performance is 
 
∂πi
∂bribei
 = 
∂πi
∂ei
  *
∂ei
∂bribei
 = β4 * α1 
 
3.1.1 Research Hypothesis 
In line with our model, the following research hypothesis will be tested: 
𝑯𝟏: Power outage intensity is significant in determining the level of firm performance 
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𝑯𝟐: Bribe payment plays a significant role in determining the impact of power outages on firm 
performance   
𝑯𝟑:  Self-generation of electricity is significant in determining firm performance 
𝑯𝟒: Self-generation of electricity plays a significant role in firm performance than bribe payment 
for electricity supply 
3.2 METHODOLOGY 
3.2.1 Model Specification 
This study specified two models. The first model estimates the role of bribery in mitigating the 
effect of electricity outages on firm performance, while the second model estimates the effect of 
self-generation on firm performance. 
Model 1 shows the linkage between bribery and firm performance via power outage channel.  
The model explains the role of bribery in mitigating the effect of electricity outages on 
performance of firms across the six geo-political zones. Evidence from empirical studies reveals 
that electricity outage in equation (21) is endogenous as it is determined by bribery for electricity 
supply and electricity self-generation. Thus, to estimate the effects of electricity outage and 
bribery on firm performance, the study specified model 1 as follows: 
𝝅𝒊= 𝜷𝟎+𝜷𝟏 𝒌𝒊+ 𝜷𝟐𝒍𝒊+ 𝜷𝟑𝒎𝒊+𝜷𝟒𝒆𝒊+ɸ𝟏fs𝒛𝒊+ɸ𝟐𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊+ɸ𝟑𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒊+ɸ𝟒𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒊 + ɸ𝟓𝒇𝒐𝒘𝒊 
+ ɸ𝟔𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒊 + ɸ𝟕𝒃𝒓𝒊𝒃𝒆𝒊 + ɸ𝟖𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒊 + 𝜺𝟏,𝒊                                                                              (21)                                                                                                                                                 
𝒆𝒊= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒃𝒓𝒊𝒃𝒆𝒊𝒕  + 𝜶𝟐𝒆𝒔𝒈,𝒊 +𝝀𝟏𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒊 + 𝝀𝟐𝒇𝒔𝒛𝒊 +𝜺𝟐,𝒊                                                  (22)                                          
 Where 𝜋𝑖 is a measure of firm performance; 𝑘𝑖 represent capital intensity which measures the 
amount of money invested in physical assets; 𝑙𝑖is a measure of the percentage of skilled labor 
employed; 𝑚𝑖 is the cost of material inputs; 𝑒𝑖 measures outage intensity; 𝑓𝑠𝑧𝑖 is firm size; 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑖 
is the degree of competition; 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖 represent percentage of firm share of export to total goods 
produced; 𝑓𝑜𝑤𝑖 measures the percentage of foreign ownership; 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑖 is the percentage of sales 
spent on security; 𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑖 represent bribe payment for electricity connection; 𝑒𝑠𝑔,𝑖 measures the 
percentage of electricity from generator;  𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖 measures firms’ total annual sales revenue; and 
finally 𝜀1,𝑖 and 𝜀2,𝑖 are the error terms.  
Model 2 simulates the effects of self-generation of electricity on firm performance by adopting 
and modifying the model developed by Mensah (2016). The model demonstrates a case whereby 
firms, instead of bribing to increase their share of electricity supply from the national grid, 
choose to generate in-house power to compensate for electricity shortage during outage periods. 
Self-generation in equation (23) is endogenous. This is expected because it self-generation is 
determined by the outage intensity, fuel cost and vector of control variables. The model is thus, 
presented below: 
𝝅𝒊= 𝜷𝟎+𝜷𝟏 𝒌𝒊+ 𝜷𝟐𝒍𝒊+ 𝜷𝟑𝒎𝒊+𝜷𝟒𝒆𝒔𝒈𝒊+ɸ𝟏fs𝒛𝒊+ɸ𝟐𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊+ɸ𝟑𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒊+ɸ𝟒𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒊 + ɸ𝟓𝒇𝒐𝒘𝒊 
+ ɸ𝟔𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒊 + ɸ𝟕𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒊 + 𝜺𝟑,𝒊                                                                                                    (23)                                                                                                                        
𝒆𝒔𝒈𝒊= 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝒆𝒊 + 𝝀𝟏𝒇𝒖𝒆𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒊 +𝝀𝟐𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒊 + 𝝀𝟑𝒇𝒔𝒛𝒊 +𝜺𝟒,𝒊                                               (24) 
 Where 𝜋𝑖 is also a measure of firm performance; 𝑘𝑖 is the capital intensity which measures the 
amount of money invested in physical assets; 𝑙𝑖is a measure of the percentage of skilled labor 
employed; 𝑚𝑖 is the cost of material inputs; 𝑒𝑠𝑔𝑖 represent self-generation of electricity; 𝑓𝑠𝑧𝑖 is 
firm size; 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑖 is the degree of competition; 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖 represent firm share of export to total goods 
produced; 𝑓𝑜𝑤𝑖 measures the percentage of foreign ownership; 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑖 is the percentage of sales 
spent on security; 𝑒𝑖 measures electricity outage intensity;  𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖 measures the firms’ total 
annual sales revenue; and finally, 𝜀3,𝑖 and 𝜀4,𝑖 are the error terms.  
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3.2.2 Definition and Measurement of Variables 
The key variables used in this study are firm performance, capital intensity, percentage of skilled 
labor, cost of material inputs, power outage intensity, self-generating firms, and bribery for 
electricity connection. While control variables are: firm size, degree of competition, firm share of 
export, foreign ownership, difficulty in accessing finance, cost of security, research and 
development, generator ownership, private ownership and total annual sales. 
Firm Performance: This study considers the economic approach to measuring firm 
performance. This approach measures the profitability of firms which is very essential because it 
allow us to view firm performance in terms of financial viability. Additionally, this measure can 
be used for all kinds of businesses to ascertain their performance. Also, since profit is the main 
objective of every firms, this approach tends to measure the firm performance as compared to 
other approaches. 
Electricity Outage Intensity: Outage intensity in this study measures the average number of 
outage in a typical month a firm goes without electricity supply from the grid. Firms that 
experience frequent power holidays and do not produce their own electricity for the shortage are 
bound to make huge losses in output and profit. In contrast firms that experience constant and 
reliable electricity supply perform better in terms of output and their profitability.  
Skilled Labor: This measures the percentage of workers with special skills or knowledge in a 
particular firm. This is because according to human capital theory, workers with skills and 
experience contribute to positively to firm’s output, revenue and profit (Bryan, 2006). In 
addition, firms with higher percentage of skilled labor enjoys economic rent compares to their 
counterparts with lower proportion of skilled workforce.     
Capital Intensity: This variable measures the total amount of money expended by firms to 
acquire physical assets for production of goods and services. This is because firms that are 
capital-intensive are viewed to be more profitable due to their superior technique of production 
which allows them to enjoy lower cost production per unit (Shaheen & Malik, 2012).     
Cost of Material Inputs: This measures the amount of money spent in acquiring material inputs 
used by firms to produce goods and services. Material inputs can contribute to firm performance, 
because an increase in the unit cost of inputs will lower the output produced and consequently 
lead to reduction of firm’s profit. In contrast, a fall in the unit cost of inputs will affects output 
and profit positively.   
Firm Size: This study measure firm size using the number of employees a firm has. We assign 
zero (0) to firms with less than 5 employees; one (1) to firms with employees between 5 and 19; 
two (2) to firms with employees between 20 and 99; and three to firms with employees greater 
than 99 as used in the World Bank enterprise survey. It is said that firm size plays a significant 
role in determining their performance. This is because large firms enjoy economics of large scale 
which allows them to produced goods and services at a lower cost per unit of output which small 
firms cannot. In addition, large firms have access to credit facilities at a lower interest rate due to 
their high bargaining power (Okafor, 2017).     
  
Firm Age: This measures the number of years a firm has been in existence. We categorized 
firm’s age into two: the older and younger firms.  The older firms are said to have existed for a 
period of at least 10 (ten) years and thus, are more experienced and profitable in tough business 
environment compared to younger firms that have only existed for a shorter period of time, 
usually not up to 10 (ten) years. 
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Degree of Competition: This measures the perceived level of competition among firms in an 
industry. Following World Bank enterprise survey criteria, we measure the degree of competition 
in a 0-4 scale. The study assigns 0 (zero) to imply no competition and 4 (four) to firms that faced 
intense competition in their industry. In the theory of monopolistic competition, it is said that 
firms maximize profit through their pricing behavior. The lesser the entry barrier into an industry 
the harder it is for existing firms to adjust their price above the market price thereby making it 
difficult for them break even.    
Share of Export: This variable measures the percentage of firm’s participation in foreign trade 
outside the local market. It measures the percentage of the share of firm’s export to total goods 
and services produced. Firms that produced and sale part of their goods at the foreign markets 
are said to be more exposed to better marketing strategy which increase their turnovers than 
firms who sell all their good and services locally (Wagner, 2007).   
Foreign Ownership: This variable measures the percentage of foreign ownership or degree of 
foreign control in a particular firm. For instance, according to existing studies, firms with a 
minimum of 10% of foreign control are likely to be more profitable than their domestic 
counterparts that are completely owned by the locals. The reason is that the high percentage of 
foreign control and ownership exposes the firm to certain special expertise and technical know-
how in operation which reduced their cost of production while increasing their profitability and 
productivity.  Therefore, we assign a dummy variable of one (1) to firms with at least 10% 
foreign control and zero (0) otherwise (Halkos & Tzeremes, 2007).  
Security: This variable measures the percentage of total annual sales spent on securing the 
firm’s premises. Cost of providing security service is a form of cost which reduce firm’s profit 
and thus, affect firm performance negatively. Firms that operate in an environment that is prone 
to political instability, terrorism and theft invest so much on providing security which 
undermines its profits and performance.  
Bribe Payment: This variable measures the percentage of firm’s sales revenue paid to public 
officials as bribes. Corruption in form of bribe payment contribute to raising firm’s transactions 
cost, thereby affecting its profits. Additionally, bribe payment diverts firm’s scarce resources 
away from profitable investment, and thus, affect their performance in the long run (Okafor, 
2017).  
Self-Generation: This variable measures the percentage of electricity supply from generators.  
Firms that self-generate to compensate for electricity shortages minimize losses associated with 
frequent power outages. In contrast, firms who do not self-generate during power holidays are 
said to records massive loss in output, revenue and productivity. 
Sales: This variable measures the total annual revenue generated by individual firms. We used 
this, to proxy for large firms that receive preferential treatment from electricity officials due to 
their huge contribution to the national economy. Firms in this category possess high bargaining 
power to ensure the get regular and reliable electricity supply. Thus, a firm with higher volume 
of sales revenue indicates huge contribution to the economy and thus, has higher potential for 
receiving better treatment in electricity supply. On the other hand, firm’s lower sales figure, 
contributes little or nothing to the economy and therefore, the firm does not have any potential to 
receiving supply of electricity from the grid (Pless & Fell, 2017).  
 
3.2.3 Estimation Techniques 
This study employs a cross sectional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Two-Stage Least 
Squares ((2SLS) technique to estimate equations (21-24). The 2SLS technique is preferred 
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because its captures the potential effects of endogeneity in the relationship between bribery for 
electricity connection and firm performance (Pless & Fell, 2017) as well as the causal effect 
between power outage intensity and firm performance (Mensah, 2016; Allcott et al, 2016).  
 
3.2.4 Data Description and Sources  
The data for this study was drawn from the 2014 World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) 
database. The survey was conducted for 135,000 firms in 139 countries. The World Bank 
regularly conducts enterprise survey in order to collect information on business firms and to 
assess the constraint private investment in developing countries. The survey employs a stratified 
random technique to obtain its sample of firms which are mostly micro, small, medium, and 
large non-agricultural firms. The samples in the survey were stratified into firm size (micro 
firms, 1-4 employees; small firms, 5-19 employees; medium firms, 20-99; and large firms, 100 
or more employees), sector, geographical location. The survey also contains information on firm 
characteristics such as age, competition, capital intensity, workforce, sales revenue, 
infrastructures, innovations, capacity utilization, and percentage of foreign, private, and female 
ownership. Additionally, the survey contains responses on obstacles faced by business firms 
which include but not limited to access to finance, land, business licensing, corruption, security 
issues, customs and trade regulations, electricity services, labor regulations, political instability, 
practices of competitors in the informal sector, tax issues and transportation network. These 
features and obstacles intertwine to shaping or undermine firm performance in the business 
environments in which they operate.   
The study sample consists of 2,676 firms obtained from a population of firms across the six 
geopolitical zones in Nigeria. The data comprise 957 firms from North-West; 136 firms from 
North-East; 529 firms from North-Central; 531 firms from South-West; 397 firms from South-
East; and 136 firms from South-South regions. The firms were selected to include all electricity 
intensive industries across the six geo-political zones. Thereafter a thorough data cleaning was 
carried out to ensure firms with missing data and relevant information, were dropped.  At the 
data end of the data cleaning exercise, the following samples were obtained from each region: 
406 firms for North-West, 85 firms for North-East, 259 firms for North-Central, 232 firms for 
South-West, 158 firms for South-East and 71 firms for South-South regions. 
 
4.0 Empirical Results and Discussion of Findings 
4.1 Preliminary Analysis 
4.1.1 Summary Statistics 
Table A1-A6 on the appendix reports the summary statistics indicating the mean, standard 
deviation, minimum and maximum values for all the variables used with respect to each of the 
six geo-political zones in Nigeria. 
 
The summary statistics as reported in Table A1 (see Appendix) shows the mean, standard 
deviation, minimum and maximum values of the variables used for regression analysis for the 
North Central zone. Starting with mean, it can be observed that the average profit of firms within 
the sample is $US3,062,867 while the standard deviation values of the variables are smaller than 
their respective mean with the exception of the standard deviation of profit, outage intensity and 
fuel cost. Also, firms on average experience outage intensity of about 34.314 times in a typical 
month. Albeit, some firms experience an average outage intensity of about 1000 times in a 
typical month as reported in Table A1.  In addition, it can be observed that firms within the 
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sample spend an average of 14.777% of their sales revenue to bribe electricity officials to 
mitigate electricity outages within their premises. Also, it can be noted that firms within sample 
expend an average of $US9,734.662 to self-generate an average of 56.286% electricity during 
outage hours. The perceived degree of competition among firms in the sample is below average. 
The mean age of firms in the sample is 15years with the oldest firm being 46years old while the 
youngest firm is less than a 1year. The average skilled labor employed across firms in the sample 
is 32.789, while the average cost of raw materials is $US14,083.768. The average expenditure on 
capital equipment is $US3212.567 while the average share of firm’s export is 4.332%. 
 
Table A2 (see Appendix) shows the summary statistics of some key variables used for the 
regression analysis for the northwest geo-political zone. Beginning with mean, it can be observed 
that the average profit for all the firms in the sample is $US9,067,364. The standard deviation 
values of all the variables used are smaller as compared to their respective mean with the 
exception of profit, outage intensity, and fuel cost. From the statistics it can be said that firms in 
the region, experience outage intensity of an average of 34.042 times in a typical month and thus, 
expend 22.141% of their sales revenue to bribing electricity officials in order to boost their 
electricity supply from the grid. Additionally, firms in the region spent an average of 
$US268.443 to purchase fuel to power their generators in order to generate an average of 
41.936% of their total electricity consumed. The perceived degree of competition is below 
average while the average age firms in the sample are 15.222years. The average skilled labor 
employed across firms in the sample is 151.123, while the average cost of raw materials is 
$US11,456.412. The average expenditure on capital equipment is $US13,876.234 while the 
average share of firm’s export is 11.884%. 
 
Table A3 (see Appendix) reports the summary statistics of the variables used for the analysis for 
the North East zone. Starting with mean, the average profit of firms within the sample for North-
East geo-political is $US12,781 while the standard deviations of all the variables used are 
relatively larger than the mean with the exception of the standard deviation of self-generation, 
age of firm and firm size. On average, firms spent 5.571% of their total revenue to bribe 
electricity officials in order to mitigate power outage. Firms within the sample experienced 
electricity outage of an average of 30.753times in a typical month, while on the hand firms in the 
sample spent an average of $US137.175 to self-generate an average of 32.271% of their total 
electricity consumed. Also, an average of 4.341% of revenue is spent to provide security within 
the firm’s premises. The mean age of firms in the region is 15years while the youngest and oldest 
in the sample are 2years and 44years respectively. The average sales revenue across firms in the 
sample is 30,345.254, while firm size is 1.235. Firms in the region spend an average of 4.341% 
of their sales revenue to provide security in their respective premises.  
 
Table A4 (see Appendix) present the summary statistics of data of firms from the South-East 
geo-political zone. Commencing with mean, it can be observed that the average annual profit of 
all firms within the region is $US 302,909.80. The variation in the values of the standard 
deviation are substantially smaller than the mean across the variables in the samples with 
exception of profit, outage intensity, fuel cost, export, and foreign ownership. Firms, on average 
experienced outage intensity of 122.025 times in a typical month and thus, spent an average of 
6.044% of their total sales to bribe in order to induce electricity supply from public grid.  In 
addition, firms in the region spent an average of $US395.046 to fuel their generators in order to 
 15 | P a g e  
 
self-generate an average of 36.278% of their total electricity inputs. The perceived degree of 
competition among firms within the region is below average, while the average age of firms in 
the region is 17years old. The youngest firm in the region being 2years old while the oldest firm 
is 62years old. The average skilled labor employed across firms in the sample is 32.222, while 
the amount spent on capital assets is $US13,896.543. The average firm size in the sample is 
0.968, while the average share of firm’s export is 6.019%. 
 
Further, Table A5 (see Appendix) report the summary statistics of key variables for the South-
West geo-political zone. The mean annual profit of firms in the sample used is $US30,500,000, 
while the standard deviation is $US 2,565,850. With respect to other variables used, it can be 
observed that the standard deviation for other variables used across the samples are relatively 
smaller than their respective mean with the exception of profit, outage intensity, and fuel cost. 
The degree of competition among firms in the sample is below average. It can also be observed 
that firms in the sample experienced power outage of an average of 30.047 times in a typical 
month and hence, spent an average of 1.704% of their revenue to bribe electricity officials in 
order to mitigate electricity outage. Also, firms in the sample spent an average of $US103,328.60 
to purchase fuel to power their generators in order to self-generate an average of 61.364% of 
their total electricity consumed.  The average age of firm in the sample is 21years. The oldest 
being 168years old while the youngest firm is less than 1year. The average skilled labor 
employed across firms in the sample is 464.111, while the amount spent on capital assets is 
$US75,390.345. The average firm size in the sample is 1.691, while the average degree of 
competition is 1.708. The average sales revenue in the sample is $US 53,455,000, while the 
average degree of generator ownership is 0.844. 
 
Lastly, Table A6 (see Appendix) displays the summary statistics of key variables for the South-
South region. Beginning with the mean, the average annual profit of firms in the sample is 
$US19,900,000 while the standard deviation is $US162,000,000. Also, it is observed that, the 
values of the standard deviation for other variables in the samples are relatively smaller than 
their respective mean except for profit, outage intensity and degree of competition. The 
perceived degree of competition among firms in the sample region is below average. The 
average age of firms in the sample is 14.296years while the oldest and youngest firms are 
51years and 2years respectively. Firms in the region experienced an average outage intensity of 
25.845times in a typical month, which is the lowest as compared to other region in Nigeria. 
Thus, firms in the region are less likely to bribe electricity officials to increase their share of 
electricity supply from grid.  Firms in the region self-generate an average of 70.873% of their 
total electricity consumption during outage hours.   The average sales revenue in the sample is 
$US 20,000,000, while the average degree of competition and firm size is 1.000 and 1.042 
respectively. 
 
4.2 Results and Discussion of Findings 
The discussion of the findings is structured into six regions. Findings on each region were 
discussed according to model 1 and 2. The results of the findings for the models were compared 
and conclusion was drawn on the best strategy for firms to adopt to mitigate the effect of 
electricity outages during power holidays. 
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5.3.1 North Central Region 
The regression result for model 1 in Table 1 shows that bribery for electricity supply is negative, 
however the effect is insignificant to outage intensity in the North Central region. The 
insignificant effect of bribery suggests the fact that bribery for electricity supply does no mitigate 
the of effect electricity outages on firm performance in the North Central region, rather it is a 
form of indirect tax which contributes to firm’s total cost. As a results most firms in the region 
do not bribe electricity officials to mitigate electricity outage. This is consistent with the model 
prediction in CASE 3 which is contrary to our expectations that bribery for electricity mitigates 
electricity outages. Another interesting fact in the relationship between outage intensity and firm 
performance in the sample, is the degree of heterogeneity of impacts among firms. For example, 
further evidence shows that electricity intensive firms are more likely to be affected during 
electricity outage than their counterparts that utilizes less electricity for production of goods and 
services.  Thus, most electricity intensive firms, have over time devise means of self-generating 
electricity through the use of generators and mini power plants in order to mitigate the effects of 
electricity outages on their performance.  
 
The result of model 2 explain the role self-generation in mitigating the effect of electricity 
outages on firm performance in the North Central region. The findings indicate that self-
generation is positively significant to firm performance in the North-Central region. This 
validates the assumption that in-house electricity generation by firms during outage periods may 
help to boost their performance especially in the short run. However, in the long run it may 
reduce firm’s marginal revenue due to the high marginal cost associated with self-generation 
during power holidays. This consistent with the model prediction in CASE 4 discussed in the 
previous chapter. Thus, it can be said that firms that self-generate electricity during outage 
periods outperform firms that bribe electricity officials to increase their electricity supply from 
the grid. This finding is consistent with Pless and Fell (2017), but contrary to the studies 
conducted by Stenbuks and Foster (2010) and Mensah (2016).  
 
5.3.2 North-West Region 
Also, the results of model 1 in the North-West region, reveal that bribery for electricity supply, 
does not mitigate the effect of electricity outage on firm performance.  Contrary to our 
expectations, this study suggests that bribery for electricity supply is not a strong predictor of 
outage intensity among firms in the North-West region. The significant negative effect of outage 
intensity on firm performance suggests the fact that electricity outages is severe to most business 
firms in the region. This is consistent with the assumption stated in CASE 3. However, the result 
is not consistent with Pless and Fell (2017) and Okafor (2017). 
The result for model 2 captures the effect of self-generation on firm performance. The findings 
show that, in-house electricity generation by firms is negatively related to its financial 
performance. However, the coefficient is statistically insignificant.  This suggest that the effect 
of self-generation during power holidays on firm performance cannot be ascertain, given the 
sample of firms around the region. The rationale for this outcome is that, even though firms in 
the region may turn on their in-house generating plants during outage, they may not be able to 
generate the optimal capacity needed to break even, mainly because of the high cost associated 
with self-generation. Firms in this case would rather choose to partially generate their in-house 
electricity as predicted by the model in CASE 4, than embark on a full scale in-house generation 
to prevent electricity outages. Thus, comparing model 1 and 2, it can be said that it is more 
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profitable for firms in the North-West region to partially self-generate during outage periods 
rather than offering to bribe electricity officials to mitigate outage intensity. Similarly, the 
findings for North West region is consistent with Pless and Fell (2017), however, the findings is 
in contrast to the studies conducted by Stenbuks and Foster (2010) and Mensah (2016).  
 
5.3.3 North-East Region 
From the results in Table 3 for North-East region, it is observed that outage intensity is negative 
but statistically insignificant in the sample of firms used. In line with our expectations, this study 
reveals that bribery for electricity supply plays a significant role in mitigating the effects of 
electricity outage on firm performance in the North-Eastern region. However, the study also 
noted that electricity outage in the region is minimal and as such does not have severe negative 
effect on firm performance. This is because firms in the region, seldom experience poor 
electricity supply. Further evidence also revealed that bribery for electricity connection is a form 
of indirect tax which has a negative effect on firm performance. This is because bribery diverts 
firm’s limited resources away from productive ventures.   
The regression results in model 2 for the North-East region indicate that, in-house electricity 
generation by firms has a positive relationship with firm performance which is contrary to our 
expectations. This is because we expected the coefficient of self-generation to be negative due to 
the rising cost of self-generation which affect firm performance negatively. Further, the 
insignificant effect of the coefficient of self-generation, suggests the fact that very few firms in 
the region self-generate electricity during outage hours. This could be due to the fact that 
electricity supply to firms within the region is reliable. As a result, most firms in the region rely 
on electricity supply from the grid with no incentives to self-generate. This finding consistent 
with the prediction by our model in CASE 4 and the study conducted by Mensah (2016). From 
the findings, it can be said that, it is more profitable for business firms in the North-East region 
to rely on electricity supply from the grid without self-generating or bribing electricity officials 
during outage periods.   
 
5.3.4 South-East Region   
In line with our expectations, the findings for South-East region indicate that bribery for 
electricity supply is negatively significant to outage intensity in the region. This is not surprising 
because outage intensity is said to be high in the South-East region. Thus, firms within the region 
have incentive to bribe electricity officials to mitigate outage hours. Also, the findings reveal that 
outage intensity is negative and significant to firm performance in the South-East region. This is 
not also surprising because poor electricity supply has been reported by firms in the sample to be 
the major constraint affecting their performance. Besides the negative effect of outage intensity 
on firm’s performance, it has also been reported that frequent electricity outage increases the 
average variable cost of firms due to the associated cost of self-generation as well as bribing 
electricity officials during outage periods.  This is consistent with Mensah (2016), Goedhuys et 
al. (2016), Okafor (2017) and Pless and Fell (2017).  However, the finding is contrary to Vial 
and Hanoteau (2010) which discovered that corruption has a positive effect on firm performance.   
Also, the regression results in model 2 reveal that self-generation is positively insignificant to 
firm performance in the South East region. Contrary to our expectation, the finding of this study 
suggests that most firms in the sample rarely self-generate electricity, most of them often bribe 
electricity officials to increase their share of electricity supply from the grid which is consistent 
with Pless and Fell (2017).  Further evidence also shows that firms bribe electricity officials in 
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the South-East outperform firms that self-generate electricity during outage hours. This finding is 
consistent with Vial and Hanoteau (2010), however, it is contrary to the study conducted by 
Goedhuys et al. (2016) which found corruption to have negative impact on firm performance.  
 
5.3.5 South-West Region 
Contrary to our expectations, the regression results in model 1 for South-West region shows that 
bribery for electricity supply does not mitigate electricity outage. In addition, outage intensity 
though negative does not also affect firm performance. The insignificance effect of power 
outages on firm performance in South-West region, suggests the facts that firms in the sample 
rarely reported that poor electricity supply is a severe obstacle to them. This finding is consistent 
with Abotsi (2016) and Okafor (2017).   
Also, for model 2, contrary to our expectations, the findings suggest that self-generation is 
negatively insignificant to firm performance in the South West region. The rationale for this 
outcome is that, firms in the South-West region rely mainly on electricity supply from the public 
grid, while little or nothing is devoted to bribing for electricity supply or self-generate power 
outage. In sum, model 1 and 2 results suggest that firms in the South-West relies on electricity 
supply from grid without having to self-generate or bribe electricity officials. This finding is 
consistent with Steinbuks and Foster (2010) and Mensah (2016).   
 
5.3.6 South-South Region                                                
The findings for model 1 in the South-South region, reveals that bribery for electricity supply is 
not significant in mitigating the effects of electricity outage on firm performance which is 
contrary to our expectations. The insignificance effect of bribery on electricity outage could be 
as results of the reliable supply of electricity to firms within the region.  Further findings also 
revealed that outage intensity is not significant to firm performance. This points to the fact that 
most firms in the region barely reported that poor electricity supply was the major obstacles to 
their business operations. Thus, it can be said that firms in the region experienced minimal 
electricity outages. This finding is not consistent with Pless and Fell (2017) and Okafor (2017). 
 
In line with our expectations, the findings in this region also reveals that self-generation is 
negatively insignificant to firm performance, suggesting that most firms in the sample rarely self-
generate during outage. The reason is that electricity outage is said to be very low in the region 
and hence, firms are unwilling to expend their limited resources to self-generate. Further 
evidence also reveals that firms in the South-South region rely on electricity supply from the 
grid. This is due to the fact that the outage intensity in the region is relatively low, and thus, it is 
cheaper for firms to rely on grid supply than self-generate during outage periods. This is 
consistent with Steinbuks and Fosters (2010) and Mensah (2016).  
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 TABLE 1: TWO STAGE LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION ESTIMATES 
Geo-Political Zones  North-Central North-West North-East South-East South-West South-South 
                                                                                                Dependent Variable: Profit 
Independent Variable  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Outage Intensity  -0.022*** 
(0.007) 
 -0.023* 
(0.013) 
 -0.001 
(0.002) 
 -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.000 
(0.012) 
 -0.601 
(0.012) 
 
Instruments              
Bribery for Electricity Supply  -0.092 
(0.383) 
 -0.061 
(2.358) 
 -0.025* 
(0.013) 
 -0.200*** 
(0.0033) 
 -0.032 
(0.026) 
 -0.003 
(0.210) 
 
Self-Generation  - 0.067** 
(0.034) 
 -0.026 
(0.028) 
 0.004 
(0.017) 
 0.050 
(0.126) 
 -0.491 
(0.365) 
 -0.032 
(0.032) 
Firm Level Control Variables              
Competition  -0.828** 
(0.372)      
-1.197*** 
(0.308) 
-1.360* 
(0.372) 
-1.181 
(0.572) 
  -0.063** 
(0.031) 
-0.498  
(1.510) 
-0.104* 
(0.209) 
-11.262* 
(7.843) 
 -0.074 
(0.627) 
Size  2.301*** 
(0.783) 
1.226** 
(0.618) 
1.717 
(2.358) 
3.316*** 
(0.824) 
0.123 
(0.166) 
0.841 
(0.962) 
0.019 
(0.036) 
0.572 
(0.968) 
0.034 
(0.310) 
2.602 
(2.647) 
4.486 
(8.914) 
 
Age  4.461*** 
(1.278) 
1.595* 
(0.878) 
0.458 
(2.559) 
1.210 
(1.401) 
0.336* 
(0.184) 
1.146 
(0.950) 
- - 0.373 
(0.490) 
18.888 
(14.933) 
5.085 
(14.461) 
18.584 
(5.843) 
Export (% of total goods sold)  0.134*** 
(0.038) 
0.103*** 
(0.032) 
0.005 
(0.040) 
0.015** 
(0.018) 
  0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.008 
(0.031) 
    
% of Foreign Ownership  3.112*** 
(1.337) 
2.172** 
(1.143) 
1.033 
(3.549) 
0.615 
(0.032) 
  1.033*** 
(3.549) 
-     
Capital Intensity  0.498*** 
(0.165) 
0.173 
(0.124) 
0.146 
(0.524) 
0.760*** 
(0.241) 
  0.042*** 
(0.015) 
0.118 
(1.074) 
0.054 
(0.166) 
5.148 
(4.887) 
  
% of Skilled Labor  2.764*** 
(1.106) 
2.247** 
(1.013) 
1.315 
(1.678) 
1.335* 
(0.714) 
  0.072*** 
(0.018) 
- 0.091 
(0.345) 
   
Cost of Raw Materials  -0.407*** 
(0.161) 
-0.197 
(0.123) 
-1.113** 
(0.457) 
-0.635 
(0.323) 
        
Security  - -   -0.008 
(0.010) 
-0.088 
(0.086) 
      
Fuel Cost  - -    -0.199 
(0.399) 
      
Sales  - -   1.231*** 
(0.070) 
1.804** 
(0.594) 
 0.773 
(0.822) 
1.106*** 
(0.082) 
-   
              
Constant  8.613* 
(4.528) 
2.719 
(5.390) 
-8.648 
(12.913) 
17.725 
(6.677) 
-3.690*** 
(1.015) 
-9.568 
(7.955) 
0.470* 
(0.248) 
1.023 
(7.891) 
-0.765 
(2.131) 
115.267 
(82.190) 
5.085 
(14.461) 
18.584 
(5.843) 
Wald Test  28.090*** 25.670*** 20.830*** 45.660*** - - 35.60*** 53.78*** 524.180*** 3.40 0.55 0.21 
F-Test  - - - - 55.560*** 5.31* - -     
Observations  21 21 21 20 68 15 10 20 12 9 55 15 
Post Estimation Test              
Endogeneity           Durbin (Score)      18.690*** 5.796** 18.964*** 0.879 - - 4.339** 3.447* 0.452 7.225*** 17.330*** 0.142 
                               Wu-Hausman  80.896*** 3.812* 83.841*** 0.921 - - 0.766** 1.209** 0.117 8.141* 23.463*** 0.105 
Over-identification Sargan (Score)                      0.060 1.834 0.006 3.590 - - 5.153 0.051 0.607 0.393 1.050 1.032 
                                Basmann  0.029 0.957 0.003 1.969 - - 1.063 0.013 0.160 0.091 0.993 0.739 
Ramsey RESET       1.03 35.95 - - - -   
Note: The values reported in parenthesis are standard errors while ***, **, and * indicate the rejection of the null hypothesis at 1%, 5% and 10%, level of significance respectively. 
Source: Authors’ Computation from World Bank Enterprise Survey, 2014 
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5.0 Conclusion and Recommendations 
This paper provides evidences on the role of corruption in moderating the relationship between 
electricity outage and firm performance across the six geo-political zones in Nigeria. In addition, 
this study also assessed effect of self-generation on firm performance across the six geo-political 
zones and comparison were made as to whether it is more profitable for firms to self-generate 
electricity during outage periods or bribe electricity officials to avert or mitigate power outage. 
The findings from this study reveal that, electricity outage is negatively significant to firm 
performance across the six geo-political zones in Nigeria. However, the impact is less severe and 
insignificant in the North-East, South-West and South-South regions. Further, evidence from this 
study also shows that electricity self-generation does not have any significant impact on firm 
performance across the six geo-political regions with the exception of the North-Central region. 
The study discovered that reliance on self-generation during electricity outage might reduce firm 
performance in the long run. This is due to the high marginal cost associated with self-
generation.   
 
The lessons that could be drawn from the foregoing is that the authorities should ensure adequate 
provision of electricity infrastructures across the six geo-political zones especially in regions 
where electricity outage is high. Also, there is the need to create a task that will monitor the 
DISCOs and their employees with the aim of curbing bribery activities within the Nigerian 
electricity sector. Additionally, the DISCOs and the authorities in the electricity market can 
mitigate output and revenue loss created by uncertainties in power outages.  This can be done by 
ensuring full disclosure of information on outage schedules, so as to assist firms to efficiently 
organize, manage and plan their production activities. Firms can also explore other alternative 
sources of electricity such as solar which is cheaper and cleaner as against the use of generators. 
Finally, the decision by firms to self-generate during outage periods should be cautiously 
examined to ensure that the associated marginal cost does not exceed the benefits. In a situation 
where the cost of self-generation outweighs the benefits, it will be profitable and beneficial for 
firms to completely rely on electricity supply from the grid than self-generate electricity during 
power holidays.    
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                                                                          Appendix 
A: Summary Statistics for the Six Geo-Political Zones 
Table A1-Summary Statistics of Key Variables for North Central Zone 
Variables Observations Mean Standard Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Performance Measure      
Profit ($US) 259 3,062,867 49,300,000  
 
-48,700,000  
  
792,000,000  
 
Electricity Reliability Measure      
Outage Intensity (monthly average 
incidents) 
259 34.314 90.570 0 1000 
Self-Generation (% of electricity 
consume) 
259 56.286 22.838 0 100 
Fuel Cost ($US) 259 9,734.662 127,196.5 0 2,030,457 
Instrumental Variables      
Bribery for Electricity (% of Sales )  259 14.777 2.168 0 25.773 
Sales Revenue ($US) 259 5,457,673 51,345,000 5,060,000   1,094,000,000 
Firm Level Control Variables      
Competition 259 1.587 1.289 0 4 
Size 259 1.367 0.716 0 3 
Age (years) 259 15.038 7.921 0 46 
Export (% of firm share of Export) 259 4.332 10.452 0 50 
Foreign Ownership (=1 if % of foreign 
ownership ≥ 10%) 
259 0.119 0.325 0 1 
Capital Intensity ($US)  96 3,212.567 1,201.221 0 30,567.345 
Skilled Labor Workers 94 120.345 280.542 23 532 
Cost of Raw Materials  86 14,083.768 4,532 1,856 23,256 
Competition (scale of 0-4 with 0 meaning no competition, and 4 meaning very intense competition); Size (scale of 0-3 with 0 
meaning micro firm with less than 5 employees and 3 meaning large firm with employees’ not less than 100). 
Source: Author’s Computation from World Bank Enterprise Survey, 2014 
 
Table A2-Summary Statistics of Key Variables for North West Zone 
Variables Observations Mean Standard Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Performance Measure      
Profit ($US) 406 9,067,364     153,000,000 -5,087,158  3,050,000,000 
Electricity Reliability Measure      
Outage Intensity (monthly average 
incidents) 
406 34.042 56.498 0 630 
Self-Generation (% of electricity 
consume) 
406 41.936 33.735 0 100 
Fuel Cost ($US) 406 268.443 970.172 0 10,152.28 
Instrumental Variables      
Bribery for Electricity (% of sales)  406 22.141 14.543 0 23.456 
Sales Revenue ($ US) 405 15,680,123 163,432,000 680    6,789,345,000 
Firm Level Control Variables      
Competition 405 1.407 1.002 0 4 
Size 406 1.229 0.753 0 3 
Age (Years) 406 15.222 10.368 1 105 
Export (% of firm share of Export 406 11.884 22.391 0 100 
Foreign Ownership (=1 if % of foreign 
ownership ≥ 10%) 
406 0.185 0.389 0 1 
Capital Intensity ($US) 100 13,876.234 3,241.576 2,785.216 19,853.183 
Skilled Labor Workers 142 151.123 220.423 4 586 
Cost of Raw Materials ($US) 123 11,456.412 1,823.312 9,778.454 19,222.765 
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Competition (scale of 0-4 with 0 meaning no competition, and 4 meaning very intense competition); Size (scale of 0-3 with 0 
meaning micro firm with less than 5 employees and 3 meaning large firm with employees’ not less than 100). 
Source: Author’s Computation from World Bank Enterprise Survey, 2014 
Table A3-Summary Statistics of Key Variables for North East Zone 
Variables Observations Mean Standard Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Performance Measure      
Profit ($US) 85 12,781 38,947.52 -76,142.13 251,116.80 
Electricity Reliability Measure      
Outage Intensity (monthly average 
incidents) 
85 30.753 38.827 0 200 
Self-Generation (% of electricity 
consumed) 
85 32.271 29.443 0 100 
Fuel Cost ($US) 85 137.175 582.157 0 5,076.142 
Instrumental Variables      
Bribery for Electricity (% of sales) 84 5.571 6.738 0 60 
Sales Revenue ($US) 85 30,345.254 52,317.980 721.675   403,567.132 
Firm Level Control Variables      
Security(% of Sales) 85 4.341 8.801 0 60 
Size 85 1.235 0.591 0 3 
Age (Years) 85 15.882 9.078 2 44 
Size (scale of 0-3 with 0 meaning micro firm with less than 5 employees and 3 meaning large firm with employees’ not less than 
100). 
Source: Author’s Computation from World Bank Enterprise Survey, 2014 
 
Table A4-Summary Statistics of Key Variables for South East Zone 
Variables Observations Mean Standard Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Performance Measure      
Profit ($US) 158 302,909.80 2,565,850 -601,421.30  31,600,000 
Electricity Reliability Measure      
Outage Intensity (monthly average 
incidents) 
158 122.025 289.202 0 2000 
Self-Generation (% of electricity 
consumed) 
158 36.278 31.861 0 100 
Fuel Cost ($US) 158 395.046 1,685.165 0 15,228.43 
Instrumental Variables      
Bribery for Electricity (% of sales) 158 24.062 12.459 0 80 
Sales Revenue ($ US) 158 700,670.343 1,090,067 10,234.433    52,552.,000.568 
Firm Level Control Variables      
Competition 158 1.848 1.130 0 4 
Size 158 0.968 0.633 0 3 
Age (Years) 158 17.108 9.607 2 62 
Export (% of firm  share of export) 158 6.019 15.002 0 95 
Capital Intensity ($US) 50 13,896.543 2,234.222 8,658.356 19,318.560 
Skilled Labor Workers 64 432.222 520.341 21 823 
  Competition (scale of 0-4 with 0 meaning no competition, and 4 meaning very intense competition); Size (scale of 0-3 with 0 
meaning micro firm with less than 5 employees and 3 meaning large firm with employees’ not less than 100). 
Source: Author’s Computation from World Bank Enterprise Survey, 2014 
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Table A5-Summary Statistics of Key Variables for South West Zone 
Variables Observations Mean Standard Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Performance Measure      
Profit ($US ‘000) 232 30,500 393,000 -1,730,000  5,080,000 
Electricity Reliability Measure      
Outage Intensity (monthly average 
incidents) 
232 30.047 43.950 0 372 
Self-Generation (% of electricity 
consumed) 
232 61.364 33.534 0 100 
Fuel Cost ($US) 232 103,328.60 1,059,097 0 15,200,000 
Instrumental Variables      
Bribery for Electricity(% of sales) 232 8.326 5.345 0 25 
Sales Revenue ($US’000) 232 53,455 657,234 11,727  10,631,555 
Generator Ownership (=1 if yes) 232 0.844 0.368 0 1 
Firm Level Control Variables      
Competition 232 1.708 2.651 0 4 
Size 232 1.691 0.825 0 3 
Age (years) 232 21.408 18.570 0 168 
Capital Intensity ($US) 45 75,390.345 64,325.450 3,245.867 224,006.899 
Skilled Labor 80 464.111 567.340 93 912 
Competition (scale of 0-4 with 0 meaning no competition, and 4 meaning very intense competition); Size (scale of 0-3 with 0 
meaning micro firm with less than 5 employees and 3 meaning large firm with employees’ not less than 100). 
Source: Author’s Computation from World Bank Enterprise Survey, 2014 
 
Table A6-Summary Statistics of Key Variables for South South Region 
Variables Observations Mean Standard Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Performance Measure      
Profit ($US) 71 19,900,000 162,000,000 -641,035.60 1,370,000,000 
Electricity Reliability Measure      
Outage Intensity (monthly average 
incidents) 
71 25.845 30.994 0 100 
Self-Generation (% of electricity 
consumed) 
71 70.873 31.685 0 100 
Instrumental Variables      
Bribery for Electricity (% of sales) 71 1.845 1.294 0 4 
Sales Revenue ($US) 71 30,500,000 132,500,000 1300    1,500,400,000 
Firm Level Control Variables      
Competition 71 1.000 1.014 0 4 
Size 71 1.042 0.642 0 3 
Age (Years) 71 14.296 11.455 2 51 
Competition (scale of 0-4 with 0 meaning no competition, and 4 meaning very intense competition); Size (scale of 0-3 with 0 
meaning micro firm with less than 5 employees and 3 meaning large firm with employees’ not less than 100). 
Source: Author’s Computation from World Bank Enterprise Survey, 2014 
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B: Summary of Empirical Literatures 
Table B1-SUMMARY OF LITERATURES 
S/N AUTHOR(S) THEORIES/HYPOTHESIS         
USED 
COUNTRY & 
PERIOD 
COVERED 
         METHODOLOGY FINDINGS 
VARIABLES ESTIMATION 
TECHNIQUES 
1 
 
 
 
Doe & Emmanuel 
(2014) 
NOT STATED Ghana 
2014 
-Frequency of power 
outage;  
-Returns on Asset;                                     
Correlation Analysis -That Poor electricity supply results to a massive decline in production, quality, sales and 
firm’s profitability. 
2 Abotsi(2016) Efficiency Hypothesis Sub-sahara Africa 
2014 
-Number of power outage 
 -Informal payment 
 -Age of Business 
-Export orientation  
-Labor 
- Energy 
- Capital 
-Competition 
-Total annual sales 
Tobit model and 
Stochastic 
Production Frontier 
-That Power failure has a negative impact on the production efficiency of firms in Africa 
3 Abeberese(2016) NOT STATED India 
2001-2008 
-Electricity price,  
-Coal price;  
-Firms’ level of output 
-Employment 
-Material inputs  
-Capital  
Type of Industry 
OLS and Second 
Stage OLS  
-That electricity price has a negative effect on firm’s output, labour Productivity and 
machine intensity 
-The price of electricity also affects firm’s choice of industry to operate’ 
4 Cissokho & Seck 
(2013) 
NOT STATED Senegal 
2013 
-Efficiency of firm  
-Electricity issues 
-Size 
-Age 
Cross Sectional 
analysis 
-That power outage has a positive significant effect on cost and technical efficiencies of 
SMEs than large firms. 
-On the other hand, power failure has a negative effects on output of firms. 
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-Export Orientation 
5 Mensah(2016) NOT STATED Sub-Sahara Africa 
2015 
-Power outage 
-Cost of self-generation       
-Firms revenue      
-Productivity 
OLS and Second 
Stage OLS 
That power outage has a negative effects on revenue and production 
6 Arlet (2017) NOT STATED Global 
2015 
-Power outages 
-Electricity Tariffs & the 
Connection process 
-Gross National Income 
(GNI) 
OLS -Power outages negatively impact firm productivity 
-Electricity tariffs affects firms negatively but impact is severe on SMEs 
7 Okafor (2017) NOT STATED 
 
Nigeria 
2010 
-Profit per worker  
-Sales per worker  
-Age  
-Capital intensity  
-Competition 
-Bribes  
-Total investment 
 -Access to finance 
-Poor electricity delivery 
-Telecommunication 
OLS and Probit 
regression 
-That skilled labour force, export, foreign ownership and capital investment influence 
firm’s performance positively 
8 Wu (2008)  NOT STATED Asian Countries 
1998-2000 
-Firm’s Size  
-Corporate governance  
-Market environment   
-Quality of government 
service 
-Taxation 
Probit, ordered and 
Interval Regression 
-That firm size, growth rate, and corporate governance are the main determinant of 
bribery activities at the firm level  
-That Asian firms are more likely to bribe when faced with fierce market competition, 
corrupted court system and inefficient government services 
9 Allcott et al 
(2014) 
NOT STATED India 
2005 
 -Revenue 
-Capital Stock  
-Total Person Engaged  
-Material Purchased  
-Fuel Purchased 
-Electricity purchased  
-Electricity Consumed 
OLS and IV 
Regression 
-That Electricity black out reduces output of firms by five percent 
-That Power outages affects mostly SMEs and firms without alternative power supply 
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-Self-generated  
-Electricity intensity  
-Self-generation share  
-Energy revenue share 
                     
10 Alam (2013) NOT STATED India 
2006 
-Capital  
-Material  
-Profit  
-Output  
-Electricity bought 
-Total electricity supply 
-Own generator  
Optimisation -That power outage result to a decline in annual sales, output and profit across industries.  
-That Frequent power outage lowers the output and profits of firms that depend largely 
on electricity  
11 Alby et al (2012) NOT STATED Indonesia, 
Lithuania, Brazil, 
Poland, and 
Thailand 
 
-Firm level control,  
-Number of power outages  
-Return on Investment 
(ROI)   
-Generator (Generator is a 
binary variable that is if 
Firms own generator or 
not) 
OLS and Probit 
Regression 
-That power outage negatively affects returns on investment for firms that relied heavily 
on electricity for operation. 
12 Eifert et al (2008) NOT STATED 17 Developing 
Countries in 
Africa, Asia, and 
latin America 
-Sales revenue  
-Raw materials  
-Capital  
-Labor  
Descriptive Analysis -That indirect cost relating to infrastructure and services account for a relatively high sh-
are of firm’s cost in Africa 
13 Fisman & 
Svensson (2005) 
NOT STATED Uganda 
1995-1997 
-Growth rate  
-Bribe 
-Tax 
-Sales  
-Age 
-Foreign aid 
OLS and IV 
regression 
-That taxation and bribery negatively affect firm’s performance in Uganda 
14 De Rosa et al 
(2010) 
NOT STATED EU and Non-EU 
Countries 
-Total Firm productivity  
-Bribe tax,  
-Time tax,  
OLS and IV 
regression 
-That bribe tax has a negative effect on firms for full sample period. 
- For split samples time tax, tends to have a negative effects on firms operating in the EU 
countries while bribe tax affects non-EU countries negatively 
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-Corruption perception 
index 
15 Lee et al  (2010) NOT STATED Global 
2006-2010 
-GDP growth rate 
-Political rights,  
-Property right protection 
Probit regresion -That payment of bribes by firms depends on their exposure and vulnerability to residual 
right of control by government officials 
16 Pless and Fell 
(2016) 
NOT STATED Global 
2006-2012 
-Propensity to bribe for an 
electricity connection  
-Generator ownership 
-Age of firm 
-Female Ownership 
-Foreign ownership    
-Population density 
-Working capital  
-Inflation 
-Sales 
 -Electricity generation per 
capita 
OLS and IV 
regression 
-That the propensity to bribe is related to an increase in 14 power outage per month and 
22% increase in annual sales lost due to power failure on average 
17 Steinbuks and 
Foster (2010) 
NOT STATED Africa 
2002-2006 
-Firm Age 
-Firm Size, 
-Days of power outage     
-Employment 
Probit and Tobit 
Regression 
-That unreliable electricity supply is not a major driving of generator ownership in 
Africa.  
-That firm characteristics such as size, age, industrial sector, and export orientation of 
firms are the major factors influencing generator ownership by firms.  
-That generator ownership by firms will remain high around 20% even if electricity 
supply to firms improve or is reliable 
18 Adenikinju (2005) NOT STATED Nigeria 
1998 
-Gross Output 
-Capital input,  
-Labor  
-Outage Cost 
Revealed preference 
approach 
That power outages affect business firms negatively, especially the small scale 
enterprise.  
-That the marginal cost of power outages to firms  ranges between $0.95 to $3.13 per 
kwh of lost electricity 
19 Vial & Hanoteau 
(2010) 
NOT STATED Indonesia 
1975-1995 
-Bribes payment  
-Indirect taxes 
-Number of employee  
-White collar jobs 
-Foreign ownership 
OLS and IV 
regression 
-That corruption has a positive and statistically significant effect on individual plant 
growth 
20 Fisher-Vanden et NOT STATED China -Capital Panel Regression -That firms with greater power outages resulted to increase in firm’s cost by 8% 
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al (2014) 1999-2004 -Wage 
-Materials  
-Electricity 
21 Johnson et al 
(2000) 
NOT STATED Russia, Ukraine, 
Poland, Slovakia 
and Romania 
1997-1998 
-Extra-legal payment for 
license 
-Extra-legal payment for 
services 
-Firms pays for protection 
-Taxation 
-Profits 
-Industry dummies  
-Country dummies 
-Age 
-Employment 
Tobit and Probit 
Regression 
-That hidden activities is larger in countries where tax rates are higher where managers 
are more likely to pay briberies. The study also revealed that there is no significant 
association between tax rates and unofficial activity in Eastern Europe 
22 Rud (2011) NOT STATED India 
1965-1984 
-Agricultural Connection  
-Manufacturing Output per 
capita 
-Ground Water share 
-Rural population  
-Population density   
-Education Expenditure 
Per Capita 
-Total Credit 
OLS and IV 
Regression 
-That there is a significant positive relationship between rural electrification and 
manufacturing output 
 
23 Kirubi et al (2008) NOT STATED Kenya 
1994-2007 
-Electricity supply 
-Agriculture 
-Size 
-Education Services 
Descriptive Analysis -Access to electricity supply allow firms (small and micro enterprise) to use electric 
equipment and tools which increase their productivity 
- Regular access electricity supply in Kenyan rural community through micro-grids, 
improve productivity per worker between 100 and 200 percent 
24 Andersen & 
Dalgaard (2013) 
NOT STATED African Countries 
1995-2007 
-Power outages 
-GDP per capita 
-Coastal access 
-Precipitation 
OLS and IV -That power outages have negative impact on African countries GDP 
-Frequent power outages in sub-Sahara Africa impede the growth of firms by 2% 
annually 
25 Abudu (2017) NOT STATED 15 African 
Countries 
-Employment growth 
-Sales growth 
IV regression -That corruption in the form of bribe payment have a negative effect on firms operating 
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2006-2015 -Labor productivity 
-Employment 
-Sales 
-Labor Productivity 
-Bribe intensity 
-Age 
-Size 
-Foreign Ownership 
-Competition 
-Innovation 
-Experience 
in Africa 
-That the impact of corruption is much greater on larger and older firms than smaller and 
younger firms.  
 
26 Goedhuys (2016) Corruption, Innovation and 
Firm’s Growth: firm-level 
evidence  
 
Egypt and Tunisia 
2013-2014 
-Innovation 
-Corruption 
-Employment growth 
-Firm Size   
-Firm Age 
Conditional 
Recursive Mixed 
Process (CMP) 
-Corruption affect firm performance negatively by discouraging innovations 
-Corruption serve as a mechanism to boycott bureaucratic obstacles relating to obtaining 
business permit to enhance firm performance 
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